By: Cameron Fraser, BA, Newcastle University (NU)
Intern at the Institute for Development of Freedom of Information (IDFI)
In the post-Soviet context, the first Chechen war (1994-1996) illustrated to the Russian state the importance that disinformation can play during times of conflict. Despite eventually overwhelming the Chechen forces in the successive conflict, Russia was said to have lost the ‘information war’ between the two sides[1]. Chechen forces utilised numerous tactics to disenfranchise and demoralise Russian soldiers and citizens: international broadcasts to spread fake messages, pretending to launch an attack on other parts of Russia, dressing in Russian uniforms to launch surprise assaults, and overriding Russian state television with their own recordings[2]. This highlighted to the Russian government that during future conflicts, controlling the information domain would be crucial. Russia’s quasi expansionist crusade in the Caucasus regions of Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia utilised much more sophisticated approaches to disinformation which set a precedent for the subsequent 2008 Georgian-Russian war. This article will seek to understand the methods of disinformation used by the Russian state during this conflict. Additionally, despite information warfare in the successive 2014 and 2022 Ukraine wars developing significantly, the article will draw a comparative analysis regarding any similarities between the conflicts. It will then briefly outline possible methods of combating such tactics. Disinformation can be defined as the purposeful act of spreading (political) false narratives to deceive the public and international sphere[3]. It is a powerful foreign policy tool for two main reasons. Firstly, it appeals to the confirmation bias theory which stipulates that people listen to information that is consistent with their pre-existing beliefs[4]. Individuals will likely opt to continue listening to reaffirming media rather than trust a new source of information. Secondly, false information spreads quicker than truthful information[5]. It often takes a more emotional form which, especially during times of conflict, captivates an audience to a greater extent than truthful news.
The regions of Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia provided a good opportunity for the Russian state to test methods of disinformation. For many years Russian foreign policy sought to increase tension in the regions. This is most clearly illustrated by the result of a 2006 referendum. An overwhelming majority of citizens opted for independence in an election which was mired in Russian influence and deemed illegitimate by both Georgia and the international community[6]. Slow armed build-up and military exercises prepared the Ossetians and Abkhazians for Russian involvement which made it easier to justify the conflict once it began. Disinformation was a clear strategy during this time. Russia continuously lied about this subtle aggression which broke the 2005 peacetime agreement that required them to disclose all weaponry it amassed in Georgian territory whilst withdrawing from two military bases by 2008[7]. An attempted justification for Russian aggression was Georgia’s recent ties and potential membership into NATO. Russia instead tried to hide the reasons behind their aggression by creating various other explanations as to why the conflict began. The Russian state created a narrative which firmly placed responsibility for any aggressive behaviour upon Georgia. They attempted to connect quickly with the international audience through using prominent political figures such as Mikhail Gorbachev to claim that Russia didn’t even want a war[8]. This seems unlikely considering the frequent military training exercises and support of separatists in Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia during their corresponding civil wars (1989-1992, 1992-1993)[9]. Russia already had considerable influence in the areas before the conflict broke out which was exacerbated by the regions having deteriorating relations with officials in Tbilisi. This allowed them to send pro-state reporters who attempted to control the narrative leaving the region. Since it was difficult for these stories to be independently verified, it made it more difficult to stamp out disinformation[10]. Russian reports that Georgian forces knowingly targeted and killed members of bases belonging to Russian peacekeepers were deemed extremely unlikely to have occurred by Human Rights Watch. However, due to the semi monopoly control over the regional media, organisations such as HRW could not prove they were completely false stories[11]. Exaggerating emotional news, such as supposed civilian or peacekeeper deaths, is an effective disinformation tool in appealing to people’s morals and makes them react more strongly in support. Russia has replicated this in the 2022 Ukraine war by attempting to hide the number of Russian soldiers who have died[12]. Altering these statistics aims to make Russia appear stronger which might work to foster and maintain domestic support of the war.
An important factor in modern conflicts is international opinion. International support can help smaller states to combat states with vastly larger resources. The ongoing military and humanitarian aid being sent to Ukraine shows the effect of this. Therefore, the ability to promote disinformation on a global scale may be effective in decreasing the level of support for the victim state. Russia’s primary justification for involvement in Tskhinvali Region, at least to the global audience, was the narrative that they were preventing a humanitarian disaster. Russian troops were responding to acts of [Georgian] aggression against both Russian peacekeepers and the Ossetian civilian population in Tskhinvali Region[13]. During this time there was an increasing UN tendency to protect minority groups from oppressors, for example, the peacekeeping mission in the Yugoslavia conflict. The Russian state used this to their advantage and accused Georgia of ethnically cleansing native Ossetians to justify their involvement in the region, a claim which evolved into genocide to defend the 2022 war with Ukraine. Both assertions have been fundamentally dismissed. In 2008 they supported this rhetoric with media coverage- Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated that on 9th August, Georgian forces had killed 13 peacekeepers and that they had attacked civilians, residentials buildings and killed wounded soldiers[14]. This was to support the narrative that the Russian forces were acting out of protective necessity rather than expansionist indulgence. Disinformation was combined with a process of ‘passporterisation’ whereby mass citizenship is handed out to a population to gain de facto control over its people and attempts to homogenise them with Russia. Together with disinformation, this was an attempt to justify intervention with the legal support of ‘protecting their own citizens’[15], a narrative that reads much better in the media in comparison to invading a sovereign territory. This process would be repeated in the Crimean region of Ukraine with further legislation being passed for the wider country that makes it extremely easy to gain a Russian passport and citizenship[16].
There is a relationship between growing western influence and subsequent Russian resentment toward it. This is amplified during times of conflict. Despite a general lack of Western intervention, allegations of western ‘warmongering’ which supposedly aims to turn states against Russia, act as a ploy to transform the aggressor into the victim of the conflict[17]. As evidence of this, Russia claimed that the USA gave Saakashvili the ‘green light’ to begin armed conflict with the promise of American military support[18]. This was contrary to many reports that indicated America warned Saakashvili to refrain from military action as they strongly believed that Russia would respond in an aggressive manner[19]. Russia also builds on existing controversy to strengthen its campaign of propaganda and deepen the mistrust of the ‘West’. Whilst the conflict was ongoing, reports surfaced that Putin had ‘lashed out’ at the United States in order to retain domestic popularity, claiming that they had orchestrated the conflict to merely benefit a presidential candidate[20]. These events highlight the ability of Russia to instrumentalise uncertainty and incite confusion within narratives. In a period when opinions toward the West were uncertain and ever changing, the lack of coherent state narrative allowed the Russian disinformation machine to adapt to whatever opportunity presented itself.
Research by the World Bank shows that, in 2008, only 10% of the Georgian population used the internet[21]. Of that amount, most people would have been in the major cities as opposed to more rural areas which were most affected by the conflict. In those rural areas, the trusted narrative would have been relayed by a few TV and newspaper outlets. These subsequently became the targets for Russian disinformation. A frequently used tactic was for the Russian state to produce the ‘first story’ which compelled Georgia to intervene in a reactionary fashion to try to stop the spread of disinformation. For example, on 17 August Colonel General Nogovitsyn stated that Georgia had falsely claimed that Russia had started fires near Borjomi and blown up a bridge on the approach to Tbilisi, all to cover a plan to provoke fighting in Gori[22]. Such actions not only increased tensions which benefited Russia, but were also very difficult to dispute especially in areas of low internet penetration where multiple media sources which can be used for fact checking are less obtainable. In 2008 Georgia was a small nation with developing communication capabilities, Russia used this to their advantage and targeted Georgia's information hardware. On 15 August Russia bombed the main fibre optic line which disrupted communications and made defence against disinformation more challenging in the post conflict space[23]. Consequently, Georgian citizens speculated that Russian troops were advancing on Tbilisi during the nights of the 10 and 11 August as they were not able to seek information that reported otherwise.
President Saakashvili played a pivotal role in the conflict. As the leader during the conflict, and one that was thought to have been able to mobilise western attention and support, the objective of territorial integrity remained his most important goal. Cyber-attacks during the conflict meant Saakashvili was unable to talk on the international media platform CNN, limiting his ability to combat disinformation on the global stage. Russian media also targeted Saakashvili and not only blamed him for starting the war but also created stories that he had sanctioned apparent ‘ethnic cleansing’[24]. This disinformation sought to destabilise the country and perhaps replace Saakashvili with a less pro-western candidate. To combat this, efforts were made to block Russian websites, TV, and other media sources[25]. This succeeded in shielding much of the population from Russian disinformation which played a role in maintaining domestic support for Georgian military efforts.
There were journalists in Russia that acted impartially and went against the state narrative. However, many non-state actors spoke in support of Russia’s involvement. Reports have shown that, like China’s 50 cent army, Russia employs people in a similar way to spread disinformation across multiple media platforms[26] [27]. Their tactics include launching numerous cyber-attacks against governments around the globe and spreading fake narratives that support the state’s opinion. This ‘firehose’ approach creates a greater impact, as a high number of different media channels supposedly supporting the regime, creates the illusion that the information is correct[28]. Additionally, a lack of consistency with the reports counterintuitively adds a degree of legitimacy. As long as the general narrative is the same, research has shown that by changing the source of information, listeners view this as an indicator that different viewpoints have been considered, thus making it seem more reliable[29]. Georgia lacked the cyber development to defend against such a wide range of attacks. It was not enough to target Russian state media’s narrative when multiple ‘independent’ opinion pieces were also supporting its views. As evidence of this, Russian journalist, Alexei Venediktov, played an effective role in the ‘firehose’ approach. He claimed to have interviewed a Georgian photographer that captured a picture of a man grieving the death of his brother in Gori on August 9, 2008. The interview dishonestly asserted that the photographer admitted that the pictures were fake. Reuters initially published the photo in support of the Georgian cause. However, the interview gained international traction and led to other international media organisations incorrectly condemning Reuters for spreading disinformation. By doing so, they themselves were contributing to spreading Russian disinformation by not appropriately examining the claims of the false Russian interview[30].
In addition to widespread Russian, people in Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia speak their own native languages. This created challenges since it was more difficult to detect fake news. The ability to monitor information in different languages is therefore crucial to eradicating disinformation. It also highlights the importance of other, longer term, strategies such as increasing education levels to allow the domestic population themselves to identify disinformation when it occurs. Additionally, teaching the dangers that disinformation can create may act as an incentive for the local population to challenge it. Due to the emotional and confirmation bias aspect of disinformation, once exposed to it, it becomes difficult to persuade people about its lack of validity[31]. Therefore, it is more effective to warn people about fake news rather than try to persuade them it is fake after its publication.
Prior to the 2008 war there was greater (although still severely limited) freedom for independent Russian media. There were several cases of Russian journalists and media organisations speaking out against their home nation. Journalists such as Yuliya Latynina argued that Georgia would win the conflict since it had a strategic goal, compared to Russia who “believed the war was won by those who lied the most ''[32]. This domestic deviation from the state narrative is very effective in combatting disinformation. If there are competing narratives from the source of disinformation, doubt is created in the minds of the readers as to the authenticity of the material they are given. Moving forward to more recent conflicts, this form of dissent might have acted as a catalyst for Russia to impose even stricter punishment and regulation on those who do not share the party narrative. Individuals such as Marina Ovsyannikova reportedly received a 14-hour interrogation after protesting the Ukraine conflict on a live TV news show on March 14, 2022[33]. Supporting those that dissent against their regime with the aim of providing more factually correct information is crucial in combatting disinformation.
It is important to note that the 2008 war was one of the last conflicts where social media was yet to have a pivotal impact[34]. Social media in subsequent conflicts, such as the Arab Spring revolutions, played a large role in the impact and depth of its reach. Whilst social media brings new opportunities to combat disinformation, there remains some lessons that can be learnt from the 2008 war. For example, there was reported to be a significant rise in the number of independent Georgian bloggers. These individuals used this ‘new media’ to attempt to combat Russian disinformation on both the domestic and global stage. Their domestic reach increased greatly over the course of 2008[35]. Furthermore, international media groups such as CNN and Global Voices Online collated the material and promoted it on their platforms[36]. This first-hand reporting powerfully combats disinformation since it often contains emotional stories which resonate with the reader. As social media grows, this demonstrates the increasing impact it can have against disinformation. The Ukraine war displays this well as first hand footage of Russian atrocities have sparked international support and fostered domestic resistance[37].
Finally, in the 2008 Georgian conflict, Russia’s attack on the main media communication lines prompted some of the Georgian public to believe that Russian forces were advancing on Tbilisi[38]. The uncertainty and fear created provides an effective tool during times of conflict. To counter such confusion, during the Ukraine conflict, American sources have published Russian troop movements in real time to ensure Putin cannot control the narrative of the war. This is an attempt to place Russia in a reactionary position as opposed to a position where they can control the narrative of the conflict. Disinformation during times of conflict has adapted significantly since the 2008 war. Despite this, there remain some core methods to combat it. Supporting local dissenters who aim to destabilise the deceptive narrative from within or educating the general population about the risks can both be effective methods of resisting disinformation. Moving forward, the way these methods can be integrated with the growing use of the internet and social media will be an important development in the fight against disinformation.
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[1] John Arquilla & Theodore Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22 (1999): 217
[2] John Arquilla & Theodore Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22 (1999): 217
[3] Michael P. Ferguson, “The evolution of Disinformation: How Public Opinion Became Proxy”, The Strategy Bridge, January 14, 2020, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/1/14/the-evolution-of-disinformation-how-public-opinion-became-proxy
[4] Michael P. Ferguson, “The evolution of Disinformation: How Public Opinion Became Proxy”, The Strategy Bridge, January 14, 2020, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/1/14/the-evolution-of-disinformation-how-public-opinion-became-proxy
[5]Zara Abrams, “The role of psychological warfare in the battle for Ukraine”, American Psychological Association, 53 (2022)
[6] Agence France-Presse, “Separatist Region in Georgia Votes on Independence”, The New York Times, November 13, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/13/world/asia/13ossetia.html
[7] Jean-Christophe Peuch, “Georgia: Russia pledges to complete military pullout on schedule”, Relief Web, 31 March, 2006, https://reliefweb.int/report/georgia/georgia-russia-pledges-complete-military-pullout-schedule
[8] Mikhail Gorbachev, “Russia Never Wanted a War”, The New York Times, 19 August, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/20/opinion/20gorbachev.html
[9]Michael Kofman, “The August War 10 Years On: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War”, War on the Rocks, August 17, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-august-war-ten-years-on-a-retrospective-on-the-russo-georgian-war/
[10] Michael P. Ferguson, “The evolution of Disinformation: How Public Opinion Became Proxy”, The Strategy Bridge, January 14, 2020, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/1/14/the-evolution-of-disinformation-how-public-opinion-became-proxy
[11] “Independent International fact-finding mission on the conflict in Georgia”, International Committee of the Red Cross, accessed September 13 , 2022, https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/georgiarussia-independent-international-fact-finding-mission-conflict-south-ossetia
[12] Eliza Mackintosh, “The bodies of Russian soldier are piling up in Ukraine, as the Kremlin conceals true toll of war”, CNN, March 23, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/23/europe/ukraine-war-russian-soldiers-deaths-cmd-intl/index.html
[13] Roy Allison, “Russia Resurgent? Moscow's Campaign to 'Coerce Georgia to Peace'”, International Affairs, 84 (2008): 1151
[14]Timothy L. Thomas , “The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five Day War in South Ossetia”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22 (2009): 50
[15] Michael Kofman, “The August War 10 Years On: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War”, War on the Rocks, August 17, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-august-war-ten-years-on-a-retrospective-on-the-russo-georgian-war/
[16] Anastasiya Oprishcenk, “What awaits Ukraines in the Occupation”, Zaborana, June 20 (2022), https://zaborona.com/en/a-russian-passport-in-crimea-and-donbas-is-both-a-punishment-and-a-right-to-a-normal-life-what-awaits-ukrainians-in-the-occupation-analysis-of-zaborona/
[17] Natia Seskuria, “Russia is reenacting its Georgia playbook in Ukraine”, Foreign Policy, February 22 (2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/22/russia-ukraine-invasion-georgia-2008-south-ossetia-tskhinvali/
[18] Michael Kofman, “The August War 10 Years On: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War”, War on the Rocks, August 17, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/08/the-august-war-ten-years-on-a-retrospective-on-the-russo-georgian-war/
[19] Susan Cornwell, “US says warned Georgia against Russia fight”, Reuters, August 19 (2008), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia-usa-idUSN1947796120080819
[20] Clifford J. Levy, “Putin Suggests US Provocation in Georgia Clash”, The New York Times, August 28 (2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/world/europe/29putin.html
[21] World Bank, Individuals using the internet (Georgia), 2008, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?end=2008&locations=GE&start=1990
[22] Timothy L. Thomas , “The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five Day War in South Ossetia”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22 (2009): 52
[23] Deibert RJ, Rohozinski R & Crete-Nishihata M, “Cyclones in cyberspace: Information shaping and denial in the 2008 Russia–Georgia war”, Security Dialogue, 43 (2012): 8.
[24] Jadwiga Rogoża, “Russian propaganda war: media as a long- and short-range weapon”, centre for eastern studies, 9 (2008):4
[25] Timothy L. Thomas , “The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five Day War in South Ossetia”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22 (2009): 51
[26] Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, “The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model”, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.
[27] Leo Benedictus, “Invasion of the troll armies: from Russian Trump supporters to Turkish state stooges”, The Guardian, 6 November, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/nov/06/troll-armies-social-media-trump-russian
[28] Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, “The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model”, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.
[29] Christopher Paul & Miriam Matthews, “The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model”, RAND Corporation, 2016, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.
[30] David Axe, “Possibly staged pictures fueled Georgian propaganda push”, Wired, September 5 (2008), https://www.wired.com/2008/09/fake-georgia-pi/
[31] Zara Abrams, “The role of psychological warfare in the battle for Ukraine”, American Psychological Association, 53 (2022)
[32] Timothy L. Thomas , “The Bear Went Through the Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five Day War in South Ossetia”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22 (2009): 36
[33] Tim Stelloh, “Russian TV employee who staged on-air protest says she was interrogated for more than 14 hours”, NBC News, March 16, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russian-tv-employee-staged-air-protest-says-was-interrogated-14-hours-rcna20215
[34] Alexander Grinberg, “Controlling the Narrative: How Political Warfare Can Influence Policy”, The Strategy Bridge, July 31, 2008, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/7/31/controlling-the-narrative-how-political-warfare-can-influence-policy
[35] Dali Osepashvili, “New Media and Russian-Georgian 2008 War”, Journalism and Mass Communication, 4 (2006)
[36] Bloggers weigh in on Georgia, CNN, accessed September 9, 2022, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/08/12/georgia.bloggers/
[37] Megan Specia, “‘Like a weapon’: Ukrainians use Social Media to Stir Resistance”, The New York Times, March 25, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/world/europe/ukraine-war-social-media.html
[38] Deibert RJ, Rohozinski R & Crete-Nishihata M, “Cyclones in cyberspace: Information shaping and denial in the 2008 Russia–Georgia war”, Security Dialogue, 43 (2012): 12
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