On July 9, 2024, The Group of States against Corruption of the European Council (GRECO) published an Evaluation Report on Georgia within the framework of the Fifth Evaluation Round. The report was adopted by GRECO at its 96th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg, 18-22 March 2024) and was based on the results of the on-site visit to Tbilisi carried out by our evaluation team from 19 to 23 June 2023 as well as other information received, including from civil society (par. 11).
The report reviews the effectiveness of the accountability, integrity and anti-corruption mechanisms of high-level officials and law enforcement. In this regard, the report indicates several challenges in different fields and addresses 27 recommendations to be implemented in total.
As of the recommendations addressed in the previous (fourth) round and the state of their implementation, GRECO had addressed 16 recommendations. At the preceding stages of the compliance procedure, eight recommendations had been implemented satisfactorily or dealt with in a satisfactory manner, six recommendations had been partly implemented and two recommendations had not been implemented (GRECO report on the Fourth Evaluation Round. Par. 5). For previous round recommendations, you can also see IDFI's analysis.
As for the new recommendations, addressed in the framework of the Fifth Evaluation Round and the Evaluation report issued in this round, it is noteworthy that the challenges and part of subsequent recommendations, especially in terms of the Anti-Corruption Bureau’s role and public information, significantly echoes IDFI’s findings and recommendations. This analysis will review these very assessments of GRECO, as well as present the recommendations issued within the framework of the Fifth Evaluation Round and their state of implementation.
GRECO's report assesses the institutional framework of the newly created Anti-Corruption Bureau, accountability mechanisms and safeguards of its independence. Although the report notes that the bureau is still a young institution and it has only been equipped with the functions of asset declaration monitoring, protection of whistleblowers and financial monitoring of political parties since September 2023, and it is still “premature to assess the role that the Bureau will play in the current anti-corruption institutional framework” (par. 67), however the report clearly states that there are serious concerns regarding the Bureau’s independence. Concerns have been expressed as to the independence of the Bureau, mainly, due to the fact that its Head is appointed and terminated by the Prime Minister. The report refers to the opinion of the Venice Commission which requested some further amendments to strengthen the independence of the Bureau, especially in terms of appointment and termination of the Bureau Head. (par. 68) (meaning that the Bureau Head should be appointed by the qualified majority of the Parliament rather than the Prime Minister). According to the document, this issue “requires further attention, especially given the functions devoted to the Bureau” and critical need for its independence (par. 68).
It is important that, in this regard, GRECO’s recommendations addresses one of the most crucial problems related to the Bureau’s independence which was identified in the Venice Commission’s opinion of December 18 2023, as well as being one of the main issues to be addressed in the framework of implementation 7th step defined by the European Commission. It should be mentioned that after the adoption of this report, On May 29, 2024, the Parliament of Georgia adopted legislative amendments to the law of Georgia “On the Fight Against Corruption”. The Parliament of Georgia attributes these amendments and the stated purpose of them is to implement the European Commission’s 7th step, through addressing the Venice Commission’s and the European Commission’s recommendations.
Although the adopted legislative amendments addressed part of the problems identified by the Venice Commission, among them the Anti-Corruption Bureau's accountability to the Anti-Corruption Council was removed, guarantees for the functional immunity of the Bureau Head increased, although the amendments did not address the procedure for appointing the Bureau Head. Based on the available information, the Parliament of Georgia completed the process of the Bureau’s institutional reform by adopting this draft law, and, at this point, the adoption of other legislative changes in not on the political agenda of the ruling party.
Therefore, in this regard, GRECO recommends that “(i) the legal framework of the AntiCorruption Bureau be revised in order to provide it with increased operational independence; and (ii) the Anti-Corruption Bureau be provided with adequate financial and human resources to perform its tasks effectively notably with respect to persons with top executive functions.” (par. 69).
GRECO also reviews the effectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Bureau in terms of asset declarations. In this regard, the report notes that public officials “are not obliged to declare the assets of close relatives (other than spouse, minor child or stepchild) if they are not permanently living with that person. According to several interlocutors met by the GET, this loophole is used to circumvent declaration requirements, for instance by transferring assets to a partner who is purposely not registered at the same address.” (par. 144).
In terms of Asset Declarations, GRECO recommends “(i) extending the system of asset declarations to all persons with top executive functions, including all advisers to the Prime Minister and ministers; (ii) clarifying the notion of family members whose financial information should be included in such declarations; and (iii) broadening the scope of information made public in asset declarations submitted by persons with top executive functions to include paid work in the reporting period prior to appointment and following the end of the mandate.” (par. 146).
It should be noted that extension of the list of persons subject to mandatory asset declarations and expanding the definition of a member of the family of a declarant is also considered to be one of the challenges by the European Commission (p. 8). IDFI also addressed the Parliament of Georgia with a recommendation to adopt relevant legislative changes in 2022, within the framework of the implementation of European Commission’s 12 priorities. However, this recommendation was neglected by the ruling party and is not reflected in the recently adopted legislative amendments as well.
The report also reviews the issue related to investigation of corruption crimes. It is noted that the main body, equipped with the investigative powers in this regard is the Special Investigation Service of the State Security Service. The report reviews the problems and challenges in Georgia, especially, in terms of investigating high level corruption cases. The report notes that “there is a complex system of investigation of corruption offences in Georgia” (par. 160). “While the general perception is that petty corruption in the country is addressed, interlocutors met on-site were particularly concerned that the current system does not lead to effective investigation and prosecution of high-level officials suspected of having committed corruption related offences.” - says the report (par. 160).
Taken the above, GRECO recommends “ensuring the independence and effectiveness in practice of criminal investigations and prosecutions of persons with top executive functions suspected of having committed corruption related offences in order to guarantee the integrity of prosecutions.” (par. 161).
Taking into consideration the specifics of high-level corruption, the independence and impartiality of bodies with investigative, criminal prosecution, or justice implementation functions become of crucial importance. Thus, creation of an independent body which would be responsible for investigating corruption related cases was one of the main recommendations/requests of the European Commission. Within the framework of implementation of 12 priorities of the European Union, creation of an independent Anti-Corruption Bureau was considered to be a positive step, however, not equipping it with investigative powers received harsh criticism. The critical need for such was stated by IDFI, not only in public documents, but during the parliamentary discussions related to the creation of the Anti-Corruption Bureau as well. Subsequently, this recommendation was then clearly outlined by the Venice Commission and became one of the key requirements for the implementation of the 7th step of the European Union. As of today, the Anti-Corruption Bureau still does not have the powers to investigate corruption related crimes.
The report indicates the sharp decline of access to public information during the recent years as one of the problematic issues. The report notes that “the right of the public to request and receive information from public authorities is enshrined in the Constitution. However, it is concerned that access to information is strongly hampered in practice.” (par. 83). The interviews conducted by GRECO revealed that there has been a sharp decrease in transparency of public institutions in recent years and frequent violations of the freedom of information took place. The report revealed inconsistent practice of issuance of public information in the executive government. “some ministries being rather open, while others, citing the Ministry of Culture, are rarely, if ever, responding to information requests.Moreover, there is a clear lack of proactive disclosure of public documents by the Executive.” (par. 84).
In reviewing the severely deteriorated state of access to public information, the report refers to IDFI's 2022 report (para. 81) - “Access to Public Information in Georgia 2022”, which indicated that in 2022, the response rates of public institutions decreased by 24 percent compared to the previous year and amounted to 58%. This indicator is the lowest result since 2010. It should be noted that the sharp decline in this regard and the growing trend of systemic unlawfulness and unjustified closure of information by public institutions, especially by the representatives of the central government, continued even after 2022 and still remains an important challenge (see IDFI’s study of June 8, 2023 “Sharp Decline in Access to Public Information”).
As one of the main causes of such deterioration GRECO’s report states the fact that there is no special independent body to supervise the exercise of the right to access public information and receive complaints, and the protection of the right through the court is ineffective due to lengthy time limits and delays (par. 82). In this regard, the report refers to the 2022 parliamentary report of the Public Defender of Georgia (par. 82) which in turn, when discussing the ineffectiveness of the mechanisms for protecting the right to access to public information, among other things, relies on IDFI's research.
Taking into account the above, GRECO “recommends (i) that further measures be taken to ensure a timely access to information, as well as to enhance proactive transparency; and (ii) to ensure that an independent oversight mechanism, vested with adequate powers and resources, guarantees the effective implementation of the freedom of information legislation.” (par. 86).
Additionally, GRECO specifically indicates the type of information of high public interest - the information on advisers of the Prime Minister and Ministers. In this regard, it is noteworthy that GRECO refers to the IDFI’s report of 2021 which “underlined that information related to advisers had proved to be one of the most challenging to receive, among the requests sent by IDFI to public institutions over the years.” (par. 39). These governmental bodies would often refer to the rules of personal data protection when limiting the right to access to public information. Regarding this specific basis, GRECO mentions that “Concerns were also expressed about… use of personal data protection rules as a shield to avoid transparency requirements” (par. 85). Therefore, GRECO addresses an independent recommendation regarding this issue: “the names and functions of all advisers in Government be made public and easily accessible online” (par. 40).
It should be noted that the report singles out the challenges in terms of the transparency of the law enforcement system, specifically the police. The report mentions that interlocutors, including journalists, “were finding their work rendered increasingly difficult as access to public information on the police is often denied or made deliberately difficult to obtain.” (par. 183). To that end, GRECO recommends that “the existing framework on access to policing information be reviewed to make information more readily available while preserving the integrity of ongoing investigations.” (par.. 183).
In addition to the above, GRECO defined a number of other recommendations for Georgia to implement within the framework of the Fifth Evaluation Round, regarding, open governance, effectiveness and accountability of law enforcement agencies, public administration reform, code of ethics in public service, transparency of legislative process, regulating the relationship between high ranking officials and lobbyists and third parties, improving the rules regarding gifts and other benefits for persons with top executive functions and other directions. Furthermore, the recommendation related to the checking of integrity of high ranking officials needs to be mentioned specifically. GRECO points out that Georgi should “lay down rules requiring that integrity checks take place prior to the appointment of ministers and deputy ministers in order to identify and manage possible risks of conflicts of interest before joining government.” (par. 32).
A deadline for implementing these recommendations defined by GRECO is 18 months after the adoption of the report (par. 10). According to the report, the government of Georgia should submit a report on the measures taken to implement the above-mentioned recommendations by 30 September 2025. The measures will be assessed by GRECO through its specific compliance procedure (par. 294). We call on the government to return to the path of reforms and start the process of implementing the recommendations without delay.
This material has been financed by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, Sida. Responsibility for the content rests entirely with the creator. Sida does not necessarily share the expressed views and interpretations.
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