The essence of Russia’s contemporary hybrid warfare is not defined solely by the use of military force. One of its central components is the deliberate manipulation of the informational, cultural, and historical space. The purpose of this strategy is to weaken the target society from within, fragment political will, and undermine the legitimacy of sovereign choice.

Russian propaganda directed at Georgia is a multilayered system. On the surface, it may appear to be a collection of separate narratives - shared Orthodox faith, the West’s moral crisis, or fear of war. Structurally, however, these narratives serve a single purpose: to call into question Georgia’s European identity and its sovereign pro-European choice. In this context, disinformation should be understood not as an isolated falsehood or an accidental propaganda message, but as a strategically organized practice that creates an alternative reality, diminishes the importance of facts, and habituates society to the idea that historical truth is merely a matter of political interpretation. Historical revisionism is an especially important part of this system: it involves the selective reworking, distortion, or emotional repackaging of the past in order to justify current political goals in the language of “historical necessity” or “restoring justice.”

Georgia is a particularly important target for this type of influence. On the one hand, it is a post-Soviet state directly affected by the violent legacy of the Russian Empire and the Soviet regime; on the other hand, its modern political identity is largely based on the ideas of independence, European integration, and a Euro-Atlantic choice. Georgia’s geopolitical location at the intersection of the Black Sea, the South Caucasus, and the Eastern Partnership spaces makes it not only a regional state, but also a space where Russia’s attempt to restore influence directly collides with European democratic transformation.

Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations are problematic for Russia not only from a military-strategic perspective, but also symbolically. For the Kremlin, a country that created the experience of a democratic republic in 1918-1921, lost its independence in 1921 as a result of Soviet Russia’s military aggression, and after 1991 again sought to return to the European political space represents proof that a post-Soviet state can be independent of Moscow, democratic, and integrated into Western systems. This is precisely why Russian disinformation systematically seeks to discredit Georgia’s European choice: it attempts to portray the West as a source of war, loss of identity, and moral degeneration, while presenting Russia as the guarantor of traditions and peace.

In this context, the narrative frame of “war or peace” is especially important. Formally, this narrative concerns a contemporary security dilemma, but its effectiveness rests on historical fears. Russia’s aggression in 2008, the reality of ongoing occupation, and the full-scale war against Ukraine create a natural fear in Georgian society of losing security. Anti-Western discourse exploits this fear in order to portray the European and Euro-Atlantic choice as “being dragged into war” and as the opposite of peace. Georgia is not an exception in this regard: Russia’s foreign-policy propaganda uses this narrative technique with respect to countries such as Moldova, Hungary, Armenia, Central Asian states, and others.

The Instrumentalization of History in Russian Foreign Policy

In Russian foreign policy, historical revisionism is linked to two concepts - the “near abroad” and the “Russian world” - through which the Kremlin views the post-Soviet space not as a group of fully sovereign states, but as a zone of Russia’s historical, cultural, and security influence.

The concept of the “near abroad,” in essence, denies the full subjectivity of post-Soviet states. The term appears to be a geographical description, but in reality it contains a normative claim: the Kremlin considers this space an area of special interests, where limiting Russian influence or strengthening Western institutions is declared to be “interference by external forces.” In Georgia’s case, this logic is especially visible: Russia’s occupation of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, the memory of the 2008 war, open threats regarding NATO integration, and anti-European information campaigns are all parts of one system. Historical revisionism provides this system with the language of legitimation: if Georgia is “historically” part of Russia’s space, then its Western choice supposedly violates the natural order.

The concept of the “Russian world” is even broader and more flexible. It is not limited to the unity of Slavic or Russian-speaking populations. Its political strength lies in the fact that it combines religion, culture, historical memory, Soviet nostalgia, and anti-Western fears into a hybrid ideological formula. The influence of the propagandistic narratives of the “Russian world” is especially strong when they adapt to local cultural codes, because the message is translated through social fears and national traumas. For example, the concept of the “Russian world” in Georgia does not operate through the language of “Slavic unity,” but through the language of Orthodoxy, the “traditional family,” and “anti-liberal resistance.” Such adaptation increases the credibility of the narrative, because it presents Russian interference as a form of defending national values. In this way, the Kremlin seeks to portray Western integration not as political and legal modernization, but as a source of identity breakdown, civilizational war, and religious threat.

The Three-Level Model of Russian Propaganda Narratives

The Kremlin’s information operations are not limited to the dissemination of isolated falsehoods. A propaganda narrative creates a unified interpretive frame that tells the audience who the “protector” is, who the “enemy” is, what “historical justice” means, and why today’s political violence should be regarded as the “logical continuation” of the past. Natalia Karpchuk’s study of the Russian Federation’s propaganda narratives shows that propaganda is especially effective during crises, when society needs simple explanations, familiar symbols, and emotional stability.

From this perspective, Russian disinformation should be understood as “narrative” violence: it not only distorts information, but deliberately changes the way society perceives its own past, neighbors, allies, and threats. According to Karpchuk, contemporary propaganda mixes half-truths and lies, simplifying complex political processes into black-and-white dichotomies - “us” and “them,” “good” and “evil,” “tradition” and “depravity,” “peace” and “war.” This mechanism is especially clear in the Georgian context: pro-Russian messages portray the West as a threat to identity and peace, and Russia as the guarantor of the survival of tradition and identity.

Propaganda creates new symbols, gives old symbols new political meanings, and implants in mass consciousness ideas that either unite or divide people. In this sense, the Kremlin’s historical revisionism is not simply an “incorrect interpretation of history,” but a long-term psychopolitical process aimed at creating an alternative political reality inside the target society.

This approach is particularly well explained by the three-level model of narratives: the geopolitical narrative explains the “world order”; the national narrative defines the state’s historical identity; and the political narrative justifies specific decisions and actions. In Georgia’s case, the Kremlin operates at all three levels: at the geopolitical level, it portrays the West as an aggressive empire; at the national level, it deprives Georgia of the status of an independent political subject and turns it into a sphere of Russia’s historical influence; and at the current political level, it presents civil protest, non-governmental organizations, and European integration as externally managed processes.

The strength of this system lies in its flexibility. The same basic message can be translated into different languages for different audiences. In conservative environments, it appears in the language of the “traditional family” or shared Orthodoxy; under conditions of social insecurity, through nostalgia for Soviet stability; amid security fears, through the vocabulary of a “second front” and avoiding war; and in regions populated by ethnic minorities, through messages adapted to local languages and local fears. This is why disinformation is difficult to defeat: it rarely operates in the abstract and almost always adapts to specific social factors.

Russian Manipulated Historical Narratives in Georgia

Russian historical propaganda in Georgia relies on several recurring narratives. The first and one of the most powerful is the “myth of shared Orthodoxy.” According to this narrative, Russia was supposedly historically Georgia’s natural protector against the Muslim world, while Orthodox unity is a sufficient basis for political loyalty. This frame selectively uses religious symbolism and conceals the facts of imperial policy: after annexing the Georgian kingdoms and principalities, the Russian Empire abolished the autocephaly of the Georgian Church, intensified Russification, and subordinated a significant part of Georgian ecclesiastical heritage to imperial administrative control. The function of the myth here, however, is not to seek historical truth, but to justify contemporary political loyalty.

The second narrative is the “prosperity of Soviet Georgia.” It describes the Soviet period as an era of social security, cheap products, order, employment, and cultural flourishing. In this nostalgic model, violence is almost entirely erased: the 1921 occupation, the suppression of the 1924 uprising, the terror of the 1930s, deportations, religious persecution, censorship, state control, collectivization, and the system of forced political loyalty. Nostalgia is especially effective when social vulnerability, economic inequality, and institutional disappointment coincide with a deficit of historical knowledge. Under such conditions, the past becomes an emotional refuge: people remember fragments of social stability, while knowledge of systemic violence is either confined to family memory or insufficiently represented in public education. This is where the function of disinformation becomes clear: it does not create nostalgia from nothing, but transforms an existing emotion into a political weapon. As a result, the Soviet past is no longer viewed as the experience of living under a totalitarian regime, but as a symbol of lost stability.

The third narrative is the disappearance of the memory of Soviet and imperial repression from public space. Russian and pro-Russian propaganda rarely denies all facts; more often, it changes the context and presents violence as “historical necessity.” For example, the 1921 occupation may be described as the “establishment of Soviet power,” as if it were the result of an internal political process rather than the military aggression of Russia’s Red Army. The distortion of the events of 1921 forms the basis of a narrative directed against Georgia’s modern sovereignty. If the occupation of the First Republic is presented as an “internal revolution,” then Russia’s responsibility disappears, while Georgian statehood appears as an interrupted or artificial project. Such distortion of historical facts is strategic for the Kremlin, because it weakens the legal and moral memory of Georgia’s occupation.

The fourth narrative is linked to fears of Turkey, the West, and “geopolitical betrayal.” Pro-Russian channels periodically use the Treaty of Kars, the historical memory of the Ottoman and Turkish threat, and claims that only Russia protects Georgia’s territorial integrity or Orthodox identity. This narrative is paradoxical, because Russian imperial and Soviet policy itself undermined Georgia’s sovereignty, while contemporary Russia continues to occupy Georgian territories. The purpose of propaganda, however, is not logical consistency; its purpose is to create an atmosphere of fear and limit alternatives. If the West means “war,” Turkey means “territorial threat,” and Russia means “protector,” then society begins to see the Euro-Atlantic choice not as a sovereign strategy, but as a risky adventure.

The fifth narrative is especially visible in contemporary political discourse: “war or peace.” This frame formally concerns a security dilemma, but in reality it uses historical traumas and the memory of the 2008 war. Its core claim is that Western integration means Georgia’s involvement in war, while neutrality or a less confrontational course toward Russia means peace. The problem with this narrative is that it transforms a real security discussion into a moral dilemma based on fear: citizens are offered not policy alternatives, but a choice between life and catastrophe.

2024-2025 Data: The Consolidation of Russian Narratives in Georgia

Materials published in 2024-2025 show that Russian and anti-Western disinformation in Georgia increasingly relies on the local context and appears less as a product imported solely from outside. ISFED’s April 2025 analysis of Russian information operations during the 2024 electoral cycle describes how a Russian-run anonymous network on Facebook repeatedly returned to the platform even after being removed; according to Meta’s 2024 report, the network spent USD 77,000 on advertisements in the South Caucasus. Its messages aimed to discredit the values of the European Union and the United States, while in domestic political matters it disseminated messages supporting the authorities and discrediting the opposition.

According to the same report, one of the central themes of the Russian information operation was the scenario of a “color revolution.” From the spring of 2024, Russian propagandists and senior officials spread messages claiming that the United States was financing unrest in Georgia, seeking to open a “second front,” and attempting to change the government after the elections. Later, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service and other officials repeatedly stated that the West, the opposition, civil society, and international observation institutions were planning to delegitimize the elections and organize street protests. Such rhetoric is especially effective because it brings together fears of Ukraine’s “Maidan,” the 2008 war, and regional instability within a single scheme.

Another important element is visible in the contemporary Georgian cycle of disinformation: messages disseminated in local media and social networks often repeat the Kremlin’s strategic phrases, though not always with direct reference to Russian sources. According to Transparency International Georgia’s report, pro-Russian and anti-Western disinformation in Georgia is spread through political parties, politicians, groups operating under the names of civil organizations, media outlets, ultra-right actors, and fake accounts and pages; its aim is to discredit the Western course. The report also identifies media channels, including pro-government platforms, that acted as transmitters of anti-Western messages. This shows that Russian narratives in Georgia are not merely an information product imported from outside; they are adapted, translated, and embedded in local political and cultural networks and arranged around local social fears and are subsequently disseminated in the form of a domestic “sovereigntist” rhetoric.

Accordingly, the challenge in Georgia’s contemporary information environment is no longer limited to the existence of openly pro-Russian groups. A more significant concern is that the central constructs of Russian propaganda—“an opposition controlled from abroad,” “foreign agents,” “a Western-organized coup,” “the opening of a second front,” “war or peace,” and “the protection of traditional identity from the liberal West”—are being transformed into normalized elements of Georgian political language. As a result, narratives advantageous to the Kremlin can be disseminated without direct reference to Russia and without openly pro-Russian political self-identification.