Author: Gabriella Calder, Contributing Researcher

Russian military strategists conceptualize information warfare as a comprehensive framework in which computer network operations, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and information operations work in-tandem, prior to or alongside conventional military forces. Information warfare preceding conventional use of force is integral to Russia’s post-Cold War military doctrine.

Within this method, specifically within the sub-concept of information warfare, Russia has recognized the need to bolster its information-psychological warfarecapacity. Information-psychological operations target an adversary state’s political leadership, military, and civilian population through clouding their information environment prior to, during, and after conventional fighting. Operations shape behaviors, perceptions and decision-making processes in order to achieve outcomes more favorable to their own state’s interests.

The August 2008 Russo-Georgian War marked Russia’s first combined use of cyber and information-psychological operations to achieve its military means. Since, Russia has worked to erode Georgian sovereignty through manipulation of narratives in its domestic information space. From this, it has developed a framework in which the slow-burn occupation of a state can continue on long after the end of conventional fighting. Russian information warfare in Georgia remains a long-term security threat which continues to degrade the state’s legitimacy from within.

Stage One: Cyber Attacks

Around two weeks prior to armed hostilities beginning, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks took down the websites of the Georgian President and Parliament, as well as various government ministries. Despite denying any direct government involvement, the attacks were attributed to Russian botnets. Attacks resumed one day prior to the 2008 August War beginning. Once again, they took down Georgian government sites, as well as those of news agencies and media organizations. Some were also defaced with pictures comparing then-President Mikheil Saashvili to Hitler and other 20th-century dictators.

Both aspects were crucial in laying the groundwork for the actual invasion by Russian troops on August 8th.Blocking information flows to the Georgian population caused demoralization and loss of trust in the Georgian government. Moreover, it also “...weakened the position of the Georgian government and created the time and space for Russia to shape the international narrative of the conflict.” 

Stage Two: Narrative Attacks

The cyber attacks prior to and during August 2008 were but one part of Russia’s larger information warfare campaign against Georgia. As mentioned prior, information-psychological operations took place prior to and during the conflict as well. The main conduit for them were narrative attacks, directed through the Russian media towards the Georgian state and population. Russia’s pre-war influence over South Ossetia let them position pro-Russian journalists in Tskhinvali the day prior to hostilities beginning. Together with the military and state institutions; bloggers, journalists, and state-controlled media organizations prepared a cohesive Russian position. By laying the groundwork for Russian dominance in the information space during the war, they allowed Russian information operations to have the Georgians on the narrative defense from the beginning.

Russia’s information warfare strategy during the period of active hostilities took place through flooding of the information space with disinformation; as well as high-volume repetition of facts based on three constructed narratives. These narratives were that: 

1) President Mikheil Saakashvili was the aggressor in the conflict due to his decision to move Georgian troops into occupied South Ossetia;

2) Saakashvili’s actions placed South Ossetian Russian citizens (who had undergone “passportization” in years prior) in danger of ethnic cleansing. This required Russia to intervene, in order to protect their citizens and support human rights; and

3) That the United States had goaded Georgia to go to war by encouraging Georgia’s aspirations of integration into the Western security architecture.

Through “...an overwhelming flow of information, [these attacks] left the [Georgian] public and target groups with little opportunity to critically analyze the information they [received].”

Post-Conflict Narrative Consolidation

After the war, senior Georgian national security officials began warning that Russia was not yet finished in trying to bring Georgia back under its control. Then-Chief of the Georgian Intelligence Service Gela Bezhuashvili was quoted as saying that “...Russia [had] an interest [in provoking] destabilization in Georgia, because it [would] be easier to rule [an] unstable Georgia.” Bezhuashvili and other officials at the time flagged several areas where Russia would continue to undermine Georgia’s sovereignty from within. They predicted that this would occur through Russian media narratives being projected into Georgia via Russian media outlets (and later on, social media sites). Georgian media institutions with pro-Russian biases would also play a role.

Three main narratives would be used. The first, which would become a throughline within all others, was the threat of another Russian invasion occurring. As many Georgians remained traumatized by the events of August 2008 and their present-day proximity to the occupied territories, this would keep them emotionally vulnerable and susceptible to further manipulation. Coupled with this would be efforts to increase Georgia’s economic dependency on Russia; as well as to drive a wedge between Georgian and Western cultural and political values.

Ultimately, Russia sought to convince the Georgian state to return to its sphere of influence — without it ever consciously realizing it was doing so. The goal in this was not for Georgia to become pro-Russian. It was to pressure Georgian leaders into aligning with Russia’s Caucasus strategy by instilling fear of reprisal through another invasion if they chose not to do so.

Did Russia’s Strategy for Georgia Succeed?

In less than twenty years since the 2008 August War, Russia has largely succeeded in creating a Georgian government amenable to its interests. The transition from the United National Movement (UNM) to Georgian Dream in 2012 marked a major ideological shift in domestic governance. Current leadership is compliant with Russian interests across all three levels outlined above.

Notably, Georgian Dream has embraced Russia’s framing of the 2008 August War. Narratives adopted continue to blame former President Saakashvili for the war's beginning. Likewise, they continue to claim he started the conflict as a proxy for NATO’s further eastward expansion. However, narratives add a new dimension for the present-day context; that the U.S. and EU are trying to open another front in the Ukraine War in Georgia. Georgian Dream officials  “...promote appeasement [towards Russia] as the path to stability.” They use this as an excuse to rollback democratic norms domestically, and distance Georgia from traditional Western partners internationally.

Through gradual, sustained information warfare since the original operations in the 2008 August War, Russia now defines the narratives through which the Georgian government perceives its national and regional security interests. "Borderization continues to absorb more of Georgia’s sovereign territory; accompanied by murders,kidnappings, and arbitrary detentions of Georgian citizens within the occupied territories and along the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs). These actions are pressure tactics —- designed to keep the Georgian government compliant, and the Georgian people fearful of renewed escalation to the level of full-scale invasion. Through gradual, sustained information warfare since the original operations in the 2008 August War, Russia now defines the narratives through which the Georgian government perceives its national and regional security interests. While not occupation in the traditional sense, Russia has convinced Georgia’s current leadership to cede sovereignty without having to return to conventional warfare."